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Whose Responsibility? The Politics
of Sex Education Policy in the
United States
Jocelyn Boryczka
Fairfield University

Whose responsibility is it — that of the individual, society, or both — to meet the needs
of citizens and to what degree, how, when, and why? This article investigates this set of
inquiries by examining the ongoing debate over sex education in the United States
between advocates for the abstinence-only and the comprehensive approaches, conveyed
here through their curricula. The debate reflects a broader ideological struggle over how
a democratic political community distributes moral responsibility. Personal responsibility
is illustrated by abstinence-only curricula, whereas social responsibility is made evident
in the comprehensive approach. These approaches establish a dualistic framework
for understanding morality that marginalizes politics, deflecting attention away from
the moral assumptions behind the gendered distribution of resources in a political
community. Collective responsibility, this article argues, provides an alternative moral
groundwork and inclusive conceptual perspective that brings politics and the power
dynamics of the distributive function within a community into focus. From a collective
perspective, the answer to the question “whose responsibility?” then shifts from either the
individual or society to both at the same time.

T

he ongoing debate over American sex education policy centers around
the fact that the U.S. teen birth, abortion, and sexually transmitted
disease (STD) rates rank among the highest in the developed world
(Luker 2006; Singh and Darroch 2000; Ventura et al. 2006). Advocates
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for abstinence-only and comprehensive approaches disagree as to whether
teaching only abstinence from all sexual activity until marriage or
including abstinence, reproduction, and contraception in sex education
curricula represent the best way to address this problem. These opposing
positions reflect a broader ideological struggle over how to answer the
question: Whose responsibility is it primarily, the individual’s or society’s,
to meet which citizens’ needs and to what degree, how, when, and why?
This set of inquiries, summed up here as the “whose responsibility”
question, directs attention to the gendered dynamics of power and the
political significance of assumptions behind the ways a community
distributes moral responsibility among its members, which, I argue,
indicates the need for a feminist revisioning of responsibility.
The abstinence-only approach currently defines U.S. sex education policy
at home and abroad.1 Over the past decade, 48 states received nearly $1
billion in federal funding to support abstinence-only programs, and 86% of
America’s public school districts currently mandate that sex education
curricula promote abstinence (Alan Guttmacher Institute 2006). President
George W. Bush’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, modeled on
Uganda’s “ABC” (Abstain, Be Careful, Use Condoms) program, extended
the Bush administration’s commitment to abstinence across the globe.2
Supporters of abstinence only, identifying the individual as the answer to
the whose responsibility question, advance an ideological commitment
to personal responsibility. President Bush in his 2004 State of the Union
Address, for instance, highlighted the success of abstinence-only
programs by attributing declines in abortion and teen pregnancy to “a
revolution of conscience, in which a rising generation is finding that a
life of personal responsibility is a life of fulfillment.” Conservative
organizations such as the Heritage Foundation, the Medical Institute,
and Focus on the Family emphasize the importance of personal
responsibility in sex education. Heritage Keepers, an abstinence-only
teachers manual, conveys this perspective when stating its overall purpose
as empowering “individuals and families to pursue the characteristics of
personal responsibility, honor, and integrity, through education and
personal relationship building” (Badgley et al. 2004, 1).
1. Three federal funding streams support abstinence-only education: the Adolescent Family Life Act,
Section 510(b) of Title V of the Social Security Act, and the Community-Based Abstinence Education
Program established in 2001 (Advocates for Youth and SIECUS 2001, 7– 11; SIECUS “The Federal
Government & Abstinence-Only-Until Marriage Programs” Factsheet).
2. Brown, David. 2006. “GAO Criticizes Bush’s AIDS Plan” Washington Post. 5 April, A03. http://
www.washingtonpost.com (Accessed July 1, 2008).
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This path to moral character development aims to empower each young
person to stand against societal forces and abstain from all sexual activity
as the only way to avoid out-of-wedlock pregnancies, STDs, and a range of
health problems. The abstinence-only approach to personal responsibility
then aligns with liberalism by portraying individuals as independently
determining their destinies by struggling against and overcoming the
negative forces of economic challenges, societal pressures, and political
barriers.
Proponents for comprehensive sex education focus on society to a greater
degree in their response to the whose responsibility question. This
approach, while emphasizing abstinence, teaches young people factual
information about many aspects of sex and sexuality to help them
navigate within, not stand against, societal forces by developing
relationship, decision-making, and communication skills. Personal
responsibility does remain part of this discourse. President Bill Clinton,
for instance, declared that “we have to work to instill within every young
man and woman a sense of personal responsibility, a sense of selfrespect, and a sense of possibility” when announcing the National
Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy in 1996 (McClain 2006, 263).
Organizations advancing the comprehensive approach, however,
highlight the social dimension of responsibility by clearly locating the
individual within relationships and a broader structural context.
Advocates for Youth, for example, states in its mission that “society has
the responsibility to provide young people with the tools they need to
safeguard their sexual health, and young people have the responsibility to
protect themselves from too-early child-bearing and sexually transmitted
infections (STIs) including HIV” (“What We Believe”). Society should
provide the structural support that young people need to make
responsible decisions about their sexual behavior. The Sexuality
Information and Education Council of the United States (SIECUS)
Guidelines, used to develop comprehensive curricula, highlight
relationships, social forces such as the media, and the role of educators,
doctors, friends, and families as essential in teaching young people to
assume responsibility for themselves and others. Social responsibility
then characterizes the ideological orientation of the comprehensive
approach since it identifies relationships and society as integral to, not
separate from, how young people make moral decisions about sex and
sexuality.
Responsibility acts as the ethical tipping point in determining which
direction each educational approach takes, linking this debate to
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concerns central to feminist ethics and political theory. Carol Gilligan’s
In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development
(1982) is a primary point of departure for feminist analysis of this moral
and political concept. Gilligan demarcates the separate moral sphere of
men’s ethic of rights associated with public life from women’s ethic of
responsibility related to care and compassion in the private sphere. Two
related feminist ethical approaches — responsibility and care —
emanate from Gilligan’s work. This present study brings elements of
both approaches together in focusing on the distributive function of
responsibility that reveals this moral concept as a site of gendered
political power.
Joan Tronto’s ethics of care and Margaret Urban Walker’s ethics of
responsibility explore this distributive function from political and moral
perspectives and are helpful in answering the whose responsibility
question. Tronto develops the political dimension of responsibility in her
argument for care as both a moral value and “a basis for the political
achievement of a good society” (1993, 9). Responsibility represents the
ethical counterpart to “taking care of,” the second phase of care when
we decide for whom, when, how, and why we assume responsibility
for meeting our own and others’ needs (1993, 106 –7, 131– 33). This
flexible, often ambiguous, moral decision-making process integrates
responsibility into the cultural practices and social contexts that
influence the distribution of resources on a personal and political level
(1993, 131– 33). Tronto shows how women’s primary responsibility for
caregiving in the private sphere transfers to the public sphere, where
women dominate lower-paying jobs such as nurses, maids, teachers, and
day-care providers. This results in gender inequality, highlighting the
structural context and political implications of this distributive process.
Walker looks at the gendered distribution of care from a different angle.
Her ethics of responsibility, by backgrounding the political and
foregrounding the personal, targets moral assumptions that often appear
as natural or given in the distributive process in order to track exercises of
domination and oppression. Society from this perspective operates
according to the gendered assumption that women in their natural role
as caregivers will fulfill the responsibility to meet their family’s basic
needs in the private sphere. Walker charts such “geographies of
responsibility” in order to map “the structure of standing assumptions
that guides the distribution of responsibilities — how they are assigned,
negotiated, deflected — in particular forms of moral life” (1998, 99).
I expand on these three standing moral assumptions by linking them
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explicitly to the political arena through the distributive function of
responsibility in order to identify shifting gendered power dynamics
across and within boundaries of a political community. Responsibility
in this study, reflecting Tronto and Walker’s work, is defined as
the geography of moral decision making that involves interrogating the
standing assumptions that determine how to distribute personal, social,
economic, and political resources to whom, when, and why to meet the
needs, wants, and desires of the self and others in a community.
This study charts the geographies of personal and social responsibility
by comparing how abstinence-only and comprehensive sex education
curricula teach teens about the moral decision-making process related
to sexual behavior. This site proves rich for feminist analysis. Gender,
sex, and sexuality intersect with responsibility in sex education curricula,
providing a space for examining the range of moral assumptions behind
the public debates among parents, educators, health-care providers, and
politicians over how schools teach young men and women about their
bodies, sex roles, sexuality, and appropriate morals and behaviors. This
study investigates the gendered power dynamics involved in these
assumptions by first outlining how internal and external boundaries
establish a dualistic framework between and around personal and social
responsibility. Then I focus on the political implications of this
framework by examining how the three standing assumptions —
deflection, assignment, and negotiation — operate in three aspects of
abstinence-only and comprehensive curricula: sex and sexuality, the
sexual division of labor, and moral decision making.
These geographies together illustrate how the dualistic logic of personal
responsibility, conveyed by abstinence-only curricula, counters the feminist
and democratic goals of inclusion, equality, and freedom. The inclusive
logic of social responsibility, made evident through comprehensive
curricula, advances these goals to a greater degree. However, it also
involves limitations arising from certain gendered operations and an
external dualistic framework. Personal and social responsibility, when
seen as working in tandem, I argue, marginalize politics to the extent
that it becomes a moral assumption instead of a responsibility, preventing
a full understanding of the gendered power dynamics involved in
determining the distribution of resources in a political community.
I propose a feminist revisioning of responsibility, informed by Hannah
Arendt, that addresses these limitations. Collective responsibility, I argue,
moves from the dualistic framework of either personal or social
responsibility to an inclusive moral groundwork. It moves politics from
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the margins to the center of analysis in order to chart the gendered power
operating in the assumptions behind a community’s moral decisionmaking process. Politics here refers to the dominant and subordinate
relationships constructed within and between categories of people that
determine the distribution of resources and the way in which people
engage in formal and informal activities, ranging from voting to social
protest, that shapes their membership in the community. Collective
responsibility brings politics and the power dynamics of distribution
within a community into focus, shifting the answer to the whose
responsibility question from either the individual or society to both at the
same time.
THE DUALISTIC FRAMEWORK OF PERSONAL AND
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Feminist political theorists and ethicists identify dualisms such as public
man and private woman as establishing an epistemological framework
exclusive of women and their way of knowing the world that perpetuates
gender oppression in the social, political, and economic spheres
(Elshtain 1981; Jaggar 1991; Pateman 1988). Applying this feminist
understanding of dualisms, defined as oppositional categories that never
overlap, to personal and social responsibility uncovers two boundaries
that create a moral framework antithetical to democratic politics
(Plumwood 1993). The first boundary internally separates pairs of
relatively fixed categories of knowledge, action, values, beliefs, and
people according to varying levels of permeability that determine the
exclusive logic of personal responsibility and the inclusive logic of social
responsibility. The second, relatively impermeable, boundary establishes
an external framework, literally conceived of as two vertical and two
horizontal sides that create a frame around the oppositional pair, which
excludes those categories outside the personal-social dualism. These
internal and external boundaries form the dualistic framework for
personal and social responsibility that results in a way of understanding
morality that marginalizes politics.
Abstinence-only curricula illustrate the exclusive logic of personal
responsibility by establishing a clear internal boundary between the self
and society in order to protect against external, intervening societal
forces beyond the individual’s control. Young people learn in these
curricula that the sexual revolution of the 1960s and 1970s transformed
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America into a highly sexualized culture against which they must defend
themselves. According to Focus on the Family, Heritage Keepers, and
Why kNOw? curricula, abstinence, which is the new sexual revolution,
empowers young people to resist the negative societal forces that promote
promiscuity — particularly the media — in order to cultivate a
responsible moral character. The Heritage Keepers manual, for instance,
instructs teachers to explain that “it is the struggle itself that creates
character, personal responsibility, and an ethical foundation for the rest
of your life. Have faith in yourself and always keep your future spouse
in mind!” (Badgley 2004, 66). Commitment ceremonies, a hallmark of
abstinence-only programs, strengthen teens’ resolve to resist the corrosive
influence of society. A pastor or priest often presides over these
ceremonies in which teens first take a virginity pledge. Parents then give
their child a purity ring to symbolize each teen’s commitment to chastity
until marriage. The purpose of these ceremonies is to hold young people
accountable for their actions before their parents, congregation, and
God. Abstinence-only programs, while recognizing the role of family,
religion, and community, shift the onus of responsibility to the
individual teen by building such an impermeable boundary around
them that society essentially becomes a negative, intrusive force.
This emphasis on the individual highlights certain strengths and
weaknesses of the exclusive logic of personal responsibility in terms of
democratic politics. Individualism promotes the capacity to stand up for
one’s beliefs in the face of societal, economic, and political forces. It also
represents the privacy and private sphere that protect personal rights and
freedoms against unwarranted government intervention. Together, these
two elements help to secure the autonomy and independence needed
for people to engage freely and equally as full citizens in a democracy.
The exclusive logic of personal responsibility, however, also moves the
structural dimensions of society so far to the margins that these factors
appear tangential to the ways in which people actually live in society and
navigate complex relationships. The relatively impermeable boundary
between the individual self and society further prevents critical analysis
of the norms, attitudes, and beliefs that shape how young men and
women understand sex and sexuality. The exclusive logic of personal
responsibility then moves the politics associated with public life and its
gendered power relationships to the periphery.
Comprehensive curricula, alternatively, draw a more permeable
boundary between the individual teen and society, reflecting its more
inclusive logic of social responsibility. The SIECUS Guidelines, for
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instance, present a teen’s individual attitudes and values as developing in
relation to “family members, individuals of all genders, sexual partners,
and society at large” that help “young people understand their
obligations and responsibilities to their families and society” (National
Guidelines Task Force 2004, 19). Race, class, religion, gender, sexual
orientation, and ethnicity, the Guidelines also emphasize, play a critical
role in teaching healthy sexuality. Engaging with, instead of resisting,
societal forces and relationships characterizes the comprehensive
approach to moral development. Teens, then, learn how to critically
assess the positive and negative messages about sex and sexuality
communicated by the media. Students in a Planned Parenthood lesson,
for example, work in groups to gather images and messages about
sexuality from magazine advertisements (2004 – 2005, “Creating Positive
Adolescent Sexuality Messages Workshop”). They sort them into
negative and positive categories, explain their reasons for doing so to the
entire class, and finally create a positive advertisement about sexuality.
Such lessons convey how comprehensive curricula’s inclusion of the
complex contexts and structural forces that influence moral decisions
aim to empower young people by teaching them how to engage
effectively in society. The SIECUS Guidelines speak directly to the
importance of political engagement by identifying the ability to “exercise
democratic responsibility to influence legislation dealing with sexual
issues” as a life behavior of a sexually healthy adult (National Guidelines
Task Force 2004, 16 –17). The inclusive logic of social responsibility
informing the comprehensive approach then suggests its greater capacity
to address politics.
The relatively impermeable external boundary framing personal and
social responsibility, however, ultimately limits both approaches by
pushing politics to the margins. Personal responsibility, consistent with
its dualistic logic of exclusion, erects such a high barrier between the
individual and society that the gendered power dynamics involved in
resisting societal pressures, which function differently for young men and
women, escape consideration. The external boundary around the
personal-social dualism further excludes politics, which moves into
the category of negative social forces, in this case, associated with
government intervention into private life. Social responsibility also
functions within this external dualistic framework, which, by excluding
politics, works against its internal inclusive logic. Focusing on the social
at the expense of the personal deflects attention away from the political
importance of empowering individuals to stand up against societal
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norms, beliefs, values, and forces. A range of gendered power dynamics
operating in society that perpetuate assumptions, moral and otherwise,
about male and female sex and sexuality also moves to the margins.
Comprehensive curricula, as a result, fail to teach young people to
recognize, much less interrogate, certain dominant masculine
constructions, particularly about female sexual desire, that leave
conventional gendered power relationships in place.
This dualistic framework also shifts attention away from political
solutions to social problems, as indicated by the limited scope of
proposed sex education legislation in the U.S. Senate and House. The
American commitment to personal responsibility builds such a high
boundary between the people and the state that the epistemological
understanding of the broader community narrows into social
relationships, which prevents the people and politicians from seriously
considering the structural and economic factors that impact teen sexual
behavior (Darroch et al. 2001, 7 –8).
Most European nations locate comprehensive sex education within a set
of government policies designed to transition young people into the job
market and higher education, provide easy access to medical services,
and guarantee universal health insurance, three factors that contribute
to their lower teen pregnancy and STD rates (Darroch 2001, 89 –90).
The Responsible Education for Life Act introduced in the U.S. Senate
and House in 2007, in stark contrast, adds contraception only to the
information about abstinence provided in family life education. This
legislation’s failure to incorporate broader structural factors illustrates
how the external boundary framing personal and social responsibility
blocks positive government intervention into the social arena of sex and
sexuality. Politics, due to the dualistic dynamics of personal and social
responsibility, becomes an arena abandoned to moral assumptions
instead of one engaging democratic citizens with the government as a
necessary component in addressing the structural aspect of social problems.
DEFLECTION AND EXCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF THE
RELATIONAL APPROACH

Deflection, the first geography of responsibility examined here, tracks how
differing views on human relationships determine the way in which
abstinence-only and comprehensive curricula define sex and sexuality,
which establishes who assumes responsibility for teaching, what
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information is provided to teens, when, how, and why. The deflection
process emphasizes one category instead of another, which becomes a
default for moral assumptions and justifies the exclusion of categories of
information and groups. Attention to the link between relationships and
responsibility in this context affords the opportunity to assess how well
the relational approach developed in feminist political theory and ethics
succeeds in solving the problem of exclusion.
Abstinence-only curricula confine sexuality to male – female
relationships and exclude the physical aspect of sex by defining it in
terms of the emotional, moral, and psychological bonds found in faithful
heterosexual marriages. Secondary virginity, commonly taught in these
programs, illustrates how these curricula deny the physical reality of
sexual intercourse. Teens learn that they can recover their sexual purity
simply by recommitting emotionally and mentally to abstinence.
Abstinence-only curricula must, according to the Heritage Foundation,
exclude all information about human reproduction and contraceptives
in order to qualify as authentic (Martin, Rector, and Pardue 2004, 15).
Excluding the physical dimension then justifies deflecting responsibility
for teaching about it from sex education to health and biology courses.
Additionally, abstinence-only curricula narrowly categorize sexuality as
heterosexuality and portray homosexuality as a choice — the wrong
choice, leading only to negative sexual outcomes, particularly HIV/AIDS
and STDs (Kempner 2001, 46 –47). Zero percent of authentic
abstinence-only curricula, a Heritage Foundation study finds, include
the subject of homosexuality (Martin, Rector, and Pardue 2004, 15).
These programs then deflect responsibility for gay, lesbian, bisexual,
transsexual, and questioning (GLBTQ) teens, 80% of whom report
severe problems resulting from intense feelings of isolation (Campos
2002, 160). Information about and relevant to an entire category of
vulnerable teens remains excluded. The framing of sexuality only as
heterosexuality, sex as emotional and not physical, and in, not outside,
faithful heterosexual marriage illustrates how the exclusive logic of
personal responsibility facilitates the deflection process that shifts
responsibility to a default category in order to justify denying access to
certain information and groups.
Comprehensive programs, in contrast, decouple sex and sexuality from
heterosexual marriage, which expands the scope of information and
groups covered in these curricula to include the physical, in addition
to emotional, mental, sociocultural, and spiritual aspects of sex. The
Be Proud! Be Responsible! manual, for instance, explicitly instructs teens
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about contraception by, among other things, having them practice condom
use with their fingers, cucumbers, bananas, or plastic phalluses (Jemmott
et al. 1996). A variety of physical sexual activities ranging from vaginal
intercourse and oral and anal sex to masturbation, as well as forms of
sexual play, also receive coverage in these programs. This approach,
though more inclusive, overlooks the different ways that young men and
women experience sexual pleasure. The SIECUS Guidelines, for
instance, while identifying women’s need for some clitoral stimulation,
emphasizes variation in sexual response among individuals without
specifying the differences between young men and women. Failure to
address the specific issue of female sexual desire and pleasure leaves the
masculine constructions of sexual norms and practices in place, which,
as feminist theorists contend, sustains male domination at this critical
site of political power (Fine 1988; Millett 2000). Attention, instead of
turning to standing moral assumptions about female chastity and
modesty, deflects away from the sexual politics of female desire.
Comprehensive curricula directly engage with the heterosexism evident
in abstinence-only curricula. Sexuality, accordingly, includes the full
spectrum of orientations, from heterosexual, gay, and lesbian to
transsexual, bisexual, and questioning that, as the SIECUS Guidelines
explains, represent a part of human development, not a choice (National
Guidelines Task Force 2004, 29 –31). A Planned Parenthood lesson on
sexuality stereotypes then has students first identify and then challenge
stereotypes and myths about gays and lesbians, such as their appearance,
sexual promiscuity, and AIDS as a “gay” disease (2004 –2005, “#7:
Sexuality Stereotypes”). Lessons in these curricula also integrate different
sexual orientations into various topic areas. Comprehensive curricula
then assume, instead of deflect, responsibility for the nearly 2.6 million
GLBTQ teens by educating about sexual orientation and for teaching
accurate information about the physical dimension of sex (Campos
2002, 156). The inclusive logic of social responsibility informing this
approach counters the deflection process by addressing various categories
of information and groups and encouraging young people to challenge
certain moral assumptions about sexuality. Focus on the social, however,
deflects attention away from the sexual politics of female desire.
Relationships that determine either an emphasis on personal or social
responsibility in both curricula connect this part of the analysis to a
central aspect of feminist political theory and ethics. The relational
approach offers an alternative perspective to liberal individualism by
building from the complex, overlapping relationships that form the social
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contexts in which people actually live. Identifying the link between the self
and others as inherent allows the relational approach to challenge a
dualistic way of knowing the world by bridging the space between
oppositional categories in order to make boundaries more permeable,
facilitating greater inclusion. Martha Minow and Mary Shanley (1996)
use this approach, for instance, to argue for relational rights and
responsibilities as a way to reconfigure family law by bringing the
relational practices of care often associated with the family from the
private into public life in order to escape the limits of the liberal justice
paradigm’s individualistic perspective. Here, I assess the extent to which
the relational approach can address the intertwined problems of
deflection and exclusion within the dualistic framework of personal and
social responsibility.
Linda McClain’s analysis of American sex education policy, which
supports the comprehensive approach, illustrates how the deflection
process works within a liberal feminist argument that uses the relational
approach to try to overcome the boundary between public and personal
responsibility. Relational autonomy functions to bridge these dualistic
categories by accounting for the public’s role in shaping a person’s
identity and capacity for self-governance (McClain 2006, 18). McClain
asserts that the government should assume public responsibility for
ensuring that citizens can self-govern by fostering their capacity to
assume personal responsibility for decisions related to their families,
whether it involves marriage, abortion, or sex education (2006, 8 –9).
The relational approach aims to close the gap between the public and
private that characterizes liberalism by making the boundary between the
government’s public and the people’s personal responsibility more
permeable. McClain, however, goes on to argue that “personal
responsibility with respect to forming families and parenting is an
important value that government may properly foster” through “the
allocation of responsibility to individuals, rather than to government, to
make personal decisions about sexual intimacy, marriage, reproduction,
and parenting” (2006, 8). Despite an initial move toward integrating the
two, she foregrounds the individual’s capacity for exercising personal
responsibility and backgrounds the government’s public responsibility
to its citizens. This shift deflects attention away from exploring the
possibilities of positive government intervention to support decisions
made in the private sphere. The dualistic relationship between
the public and personal channels the flow of responsibility in
McClain’s argument to one direction — from the government to the
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citizens — without inversely accounting for the citizens’ responsibility to
their government.
The unidirectional nature of relationships within dualistic frameworks,
I argue, limits the relational approach by directing movement from one
category to the other instead of between both simultaneously. This
deflection process clearly operates in the dualistic logic of personal
responsibility that, as illustrated by abstinence-only curricula, severs the
link between the individual and society, undermining the relational
approach and excluding categories of knowledge and people. McClain’s
argument, also functioning according to this logic, similarly deflects
attention away from the government and to the personal. The inclusive
logic of social responsibility, as conveyed by comprehensive curricula,
alternatively, counters deflection and exclusion by assuming
responsibility for teaching about a range of information, behaviors, and
sexual identities. A focus on the social, however, deflects attention away
from the individual and the political, which leaves assumptions about
male and female sexual pleasure and the masculine exercise of power
unchallenged. The dualistic framework around personal and social
responsibility then reveals certain limits of the relational approach arising
from this unidirectional motion that prevents the dynamic flow among
the personal, social, and political that is necessary for identifying
multiple categories simultaneously and navigating the boundaries
between them in order to overcome the problem of exclusion.
ASSIGNMENT AND INEQUALITY: THE GENDERED
DISTRIBUTION OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

Assignment, the second geography of responsibility, charts the distribution
of moral responsibility among different categories of people according
to standing assumptions about identity that define social roles. Here,
we examine how sex, gender, and sexuality operate in the way that
abstinence-only and comprehensive curricula approach the traditional
sexual division of labor between the male breadwinner and female
caregiver. Gender identity, Walker contends, establishes the degree to
which we recognize others as full moral subjects and the extent of our
responsibility for them (1998, Chapters 7, 8). Tronto extends this
position to broader issues of structural gender equality. She argues that
men as caregivers exercise privileged irresponsibility, referring to “the
opportunity simply to ignore certain forms of hardships that they do not
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face,” granted to them by assigning to women as caregivers what I call the
double burden of moral responsibility for taking care of themselves, their
families, and their husbands, and their own sexuality and that of men
(Boryczka 2009; Tronto 1993, 120–21). Focusing on gender identity
tracks the degree to which each curriculum challenges the assumptions
behind the distribution of moral responsibility that uphold the traditional
sexual division of labor and determine the level of gender equality
advanced by each.
Abstinence-only curricula portray the moral subject in the static terms of
biologically determined sex roles that support an unequal gendered
distribution of moral responsibility for sexual behavior. A Heritage
Keepers lesson in which students learn about the traits assigned to men
and women illustrates the implications of maintaining standing
assumptions about gender identity. Female students discuss a “Be a
Man!” handout that lists the four traits of a “real man” as strong,
respectful, courageous, and protective, which supports stereotypes of
male independence and power as grounded in their physical strength
(Badgley 2004, 68). Male students review a “Be a Real Woman!”
handout that positively addresses self-esteem and image by describing a
“real woman” as knowing who and what she wants to become and as
confident in this self-identity. The handout then states that “A Real
Woman sends a clear message” through her speech, dress, and behavior
that, rightly or wrongly, leads people to assume who she is based on how
she looks (Badgley 2004, 66). A Real Woman must also “remember that
most guys are more visually stimulated than girls, and they might mistake
your fashion statement for a sexual statement. Make sure your sexual
messages match your sexual values” (Badgley 2004, 66). The “Be a
Man” handout, in contrast, lacks any reference to males’ responsibility
for controlling their sexual behavior. Together, these traits reinforce the
assumption, often used to justify sexual objectification, that women’s
physical appearance can stimulate uncontrollable male desire. This
failure to interrogate such standing assumptions defines women and men
in terms that perpetuate the sexual double standard by assigning women
the double burden of moral responsibility for their sexual behavior and
that of men, who can continue to exercise the privileged irresponsibility
that sustains gender inequality.
This static view of gender identity translates into the assignment of moral
responsibility by the abstinence-only curricula along the traditional sexual
division of labor’s gendered lines in order to maintain the male and female
sex roles necessary for heterosexual marriage. A Why kNOw? lesson, for
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example, instructs sixth graders first to write down on token chips the
household responsibilities of their mothers and fathers, such as cleaning,
cooking meals, employment outside the home, and bill paying, and then
to place each token in one of two jars marked “Mother” and “Father”
(Frainie 2002, 4). If confusion arises, the manual directs teachers to
explain the “right” jar into which students should drop the token in
order to educate them that men and women possess unique and
different abilities. The teacher then removes one jar to show that only
two heterosexual parents can meet a family’s gendered responsibilities.
The previous Heritage Keepers lesson also conveys how the sexual
division of labor creates the unequal distribution of responsibility for care
in families. The “Be a Man!” handout, focused on traits that uphold the
male breadwinner model, lacks any reference to male responsibility for
care, indicating the privileged irresponsibility attributed to men as care
receivers. The “Be a Real Woman!” handout, in contrast, spotlights
women’s caregiving role by identifying “caring” as defining female
character (Badgley 2004, 66).
This traditional sexual division of labor, grounded in the moral
assumptions behind biologically determined sex roles, assigns women
the double burden of moral responsibility for taking care of themselves,
their husbands, and families, and for their own sexuality and that of
men. Men then reserve the privilege to exercise irresponsibility for their
sexual behavior and the care of others. This unequal distribution of
moral responsibility derives from the static view of the moral subject
consistent with the dualistic logic of personal responsibility that erects a
high barrier around each individual who, seen as separate from society,
acquires his or her identity from biology and tradition instead of social
contexts and relationships.
Comprehensive curricula, in contrast, offer a more dynamic view of
identity that focuses on how society constructs masculinity and
femininity, which promotes a greater degree of gender equality by
challenging the moral assumptions behind sex roles and the traditional
sexual division of labor. An Advocates for Youth lesson, for instance,
engages students in interrogating assumed gender roles by having them
list the most damaging gender stereotypes associated with “male” and
“female.” Same-gender groups then discuss the advantages and
disadvantages of being a member of the other gender, and finally the
entire class reflects on exceptions to traits such as male strength and
female caring (Hunter-Geboy 1995, 266– 67). These curricula convey
how traditional sex roles diminish full human expression and
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opportunities in life and encourage students to analyze them critically. The
SIECUS Guidelines, for instance, rejects the sexual double standard, such
as that found in the “Be a Real Woman!” handout, by stating that “in a
sexual relationship, both partners, regardless of gender, have equal rights
and responsibilities” (National Guidelines Task Force 2004, 73). This
position, instead of assigning to women the double burden and to men
privileged irresponsibility, redistributes moral responsibility for sexual
behavior to men and women.
These curricula also show young people that the traditional sexual
division of labor no longer reflects contemporary reality. A Planned
Parenthood lesson, for example, instructs the facilitator to invite male
nurses, female construction workers, and others from nontraditional jobs
for men and women to come to class in order to demonstrate that most
women work in the paid labor force and that men do perform
“unconventional” labor (Hunter-Geboy 1995, 282– 84). Such lessons
convey a dynamic view of gender roles that challenges the traditional
sexual division of labor in order to promote greater gender equality.
Social responsibility, which informs this comprehensive approach,
integrates society into the moral subject’s identity, thus destabilizing the
moral assumptions behind “given” or biologically determined sex roles
that support the distribution of moral responsibility according to the
traditional sexual division of labor.
Tracking how gender identity determines the assignment of moral
responsibility in both curricula indicates a stronger theoretical alignment
between feminist political theory and ethics and social responsibility, given
its dynamic view of the moral subject that advances gender equality by
understanding identity as socially constructed. Here, I consider the gender
dimension and political implications of the “social,” an arena traditionally
assigned to women, for a feminist revisioning of responsibility. The social,
broadly speaking, references an opaque set of human relationships found
in the informal private sphere governed largely by norms and mores that
correspond with responsibility, as opposed to the laws and rules associated
with obligations in the formal political sphere (Tronto 1993, 133).
Categorizing responsibility as social, I argue, sustains a strong conceptual
link to women’s assigned role as moral guardians in the private sphere,
which has traditionally justified their exclusion from the public arena and
maintained the gendered boundary between morality and politics. Such
gendered assumptions embedded in the social maintain, instead of
redistribute, the double burden of moral responsibility assigned to women,
which perpetuates their inequality.
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The social also conceptually demarcates a sphere of life separate from
the political. This arena of life remains difficult to identify precisely
because it occupies a space somewhere between the political and the
private often characterized, particularly in post –World War II America,
in the expansive terms of mass society and mass culture. In The Human
Condition, however, Hannah Arendt clarifies what the social means by
depicting it as a realm “where the life process has established its own
public domain, has let loose an unnatural growth, so to speak of the
natural,” which refers to the shift of labor and necessity from private into
public life during the modern period (1958, 47). This organic quality
differentiates the social from the political as the realm where humans
assert control over the natural and often chaotic activities of social life.
The demarcation of these two spheres holds important implications for
responsibility. The “social,” I argue, deflects attention away from politics,
understood as an arena of life characterized by citizens engaged in
making decisions about distributing responsibilities and the resources to
meet them. The social fails to challenge moral assumptions about who is
assigned responsibility for such participation, allowing citizens to retain
the power to exercise privileged irresponsibility for politics by deciding
when, how, why, and to what degree they will engage in it. The heavy
gendered weight and exclusion of politics in social responsibility
approaches, I argue, provides a moral framework that fails to challenge
sufficiently the assumptions behind gender inequality and the exercise
of power by citizens in assuming responsibility for politics, thus
undermining its capacity to advance a feminist revisioning of responsibility.
NEGOTIATION AND CONSTRAINT: THE MORAL
CHARACTER OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICS

Negotiation, the third geography of responsibility, refers to the process by
which people, individually and collectively, interrogate through
deliberation with the self and others the standing assumptions behind
the choices involved in determining the distribution of moral
responsibilities. An examination of the approach of both curricula to this
negotiation illustrates how the differing logics of personal and social
responsibility determine the range of choices available in this process
that either expands or contracts the moral subject’s exercise of freedom
and self-determination. This geography reveals that the exclusion of
politics from the dualistic framework of personal or social responsibility
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denies a full account of authority and its legitimacy in the negotiation
process which, I argue, prevents democratic citizens from developing
the moral freedom and capacity to deliberate, a component necessary
for exercising the responsibility of political power.
Abstinence-only programs adopt a character-based curriculum that
educates young people about the core ethical values necessary for
assuming the personal responsibility to abstain from sex until marriage.
This approach employs a dualistic logic that equates all teen sexual
activity with the sin, evil, and vice that can only bring teens shame, guilt,
and harm, a high moral barrier erected to show teens that abstinence is
the only moral choice. Focus on the Family’s No Apologies manual, for
instance, categorizes all teen sexual activity as harmful by associating it
with drugs, alcohol, violence, and smoking, the other high-risk behaviors
for teens, in order to communicate the same “risk elimination” message
about abstinence (1999, ii). This zero-tolerance approach aims to
eliminate any information about reducing the risks of sexual activity
in order to avoid sending mixed messages that might suggest any
alternatives to abstinence and thus confuse teens. This absolutist position
also leads these curricula to communicate scientifically inaccurate
information, particularly about the risks of abortion and the effectiveness
of condoms in preventing pregnancy, HIV, and STDs (U.S. House of
Representatives 2004).
The True Love Waits program goes further to equate premarital sex with
evil. Their Bible-based manual includes a church sermon on teen chastity
that declares, “Satan’s plan is for you to be sexually disoriented and
confused; God’s plan is to reveal His true nature through your
commitment to purity” (1999 – 2000, 15). This apocalyptic language
raises teen sex to the level of a struggle between God and Satan, good
and evil in which the wrong decision condemns the teen, possibly for
eternity. The portrayal of teens confused about sexuality as morally
wrong and evil results from the intentional use of fear and shame to
instill a commitment to abstinence (Kempner 2001; Rose 2005). This
approach to moral decision making narrows into the choice either to
abstain from sex or endure steep moral, social, and even religious
consequences. This dualistic logic starkly identifies right from wrong to
influence the teen’s decision as much as possible by limiting the
freedom to decide from among a range of choices.
Moral decision making further diminishes freedom and selfdetermination in the abstinence-only approach by advancing obedience
to authority as critical to the assumption of personal responsibility that
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defines moral character. Responsibility in these curricula results from a
conception of freedom equated with discipline and obedience to rules.
A Why kNOw? lesson on “What Is Freedom?” for instance, provides the
formula “F ¼ D þ R” to define freedom (F) as equaling discipline (D)
plus rules (R). “True freedom,” students learn, is not doing what you
want but “disciplining oneself to follow the rules to achieve self-mastery
or dominance in a given situation” (Frainie 2002, 11). Traditions
upholding abstinence as a moral standard dictate the rules that teens
must obey in order to assume responsibility for themselves. The Heritage
Keepers manual invokes America’s Judeo-Christian tradition; the Why
kNOw? curriculum turns to a patriarchal tradition of marriage; and the
True Love Waits program imposes the will of God.
Parents, primarily, along with certain educators and religious leaders,
serve as the authority figures who communicate the normative standard
of abstinence to teens and, presumably, the consequences of deviating
from it. A Teen-Aid, Inc. lesson then teaches that “responsibility is built
upon obeying consistently” since it “brings order to situations and
prevents health and relationship problems” (Benn and Derby 1999).
Consistent obedience to authority negates freedom of choice and closes
off the opportunity to consider the assumptions behind religious and
cultural traditions in which standards of behavior remain natural or
givens. Abstinence-only curricula narrow negotiation into a process that
requires young people either to accept or reject abstinence without
questioning the voices of authority, which leaves in tact the assumptions
about male sexual privilege and heterosexism.
Comprehensive programs, in contrast, take a value-neutral approach to
making moral decisions premised on negotiating a range of choices
about sex and sexuality. Abstinence, this approach emphasizes, remains
the best choice for teens. Most American teens, however, have sex before
their high school graduation and 95% of Americans have sex before
marriage (Finer 2007). That these programs address such facts teaches
teens how to make well-informed and carefully considered decisions.
The Life Planning Education curricula, for instance, provides a decisionmaking model based on the “Three Cs: Identify the Challenge, Choices
for addressing it, and the Consequences related to each choice” (HunterGeboy 1995, Chapter 8).
Personal values, instead of deriving from obedience to authority, evolve
from acquiring accurate information and engaging in critical analysis,
reflection, and deliberation with the self and others. Negotiation
becomes an inclusive process that integrates experience, cultural
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practices, and beliefs as part of the social contexts and relationships that
influence moral decision making. Moral assumptions behind tradition,
culture, and authority become sites of interrogation since teens learn to
reach normative judgments by negotiating many factors, as opposed to
accepting that given rules and traditions should determine a course of
action. Responsible choices, these curricula convey, involve the
consideration of social contexts. “Making responsible decisions about
sexuality,” the SIECUS Guidelines state, “is important because those
decisions affect individuals and the people around them” (National
Guidelines Task Force 2004, 43). A Planned Parenthood lesson then
engages students in discussing their responses to different scenarios,
ranging from a young man rejecting responsibility for his girlfriend’s
pregnancy to a young woman deciding to ask her health teacher about
protection for oral sex with her girlfriend (2004 – 2005, “Healthy
Sexuality”). Comprehensive curricula account for the complex moral
terrain of social contexts that teens must negotiate to reach decisions.
This approach corresponds with the inclusive logic of social
responsibility that promotes the negotiation of many choices and engages
people in deliberating about the impacts of their decisions, thus
promoting the moral capacity to exercise the freedom necessary for
self-determination.
A comparison of these two approaches illustrates how the dualistic
framework of personal and social responsibility excludes politics,
preventing a full account of the role of authority in negotiating the
distribution of responsibilities in a democratic polity. Abstinence-only
curricula unquestioningly accept the legitimacy of authority, failing to
challenge traditional patriarchal and heterosexist views. Comprehensive
programs, alternatively, reject authority as a valid aspect of the
negotiation process by, for example, denying parents a legitimate role in
how teens reach decisions about their sexual lives, a weakness of this
approach recognized by SIECUS (Kempner 2001, 53). Greater societal
pressures, in particular, also operate in relation to young women, who
encounter the dominant beliefs about female modesty and chastity that
still determine the standards against which American society measures
women’s sexual behavior. The oppositional positions of these curricular
approaches further indicate how the exclusion of politics from the
dualistic moral framework of personal or social responsibility prevents
an assessment of gendered power dynamics and authority’s legitimacy in
negotiating moral decisions. The political dimension, I argue, represents
an integral part of the moral subject who negotiates contexts, demands,
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beliefs, values, and commitments, given the limited time, energy,
capabilities, and resources for meeting responsibilities for themselves,
others, and the broader community. Recognizing the negotiation
involved in distributing moral responsibility develops in teens the
capacity to exercise a greater degree of freedom, given the constraints of
community, and locates politics within the moral decision-making process.
CONCLUSION: POLITICS AND THE PROMISE OF
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY

Personal and social responsibility, this study finds, involve strengths and
weaknesses in terms of revisioning this concept from a feminist
perspective. Personal responsibility, as indicated by the abstinence-only
approach, maintains the individual’s politically important role and
accounts for authority in moral decision making. Its exclusionary logic,
however, focuses on the individual at the expense of the social, which
prevents a consideration of societal forces that sustain male domination
and heterosexism. It excludes categories of knowledge and people,
assigns women a double burden of moral responsibility, narrows
negotiation into an either –or choice, and promotes the unquestioned
acceptance of authority. The inclusive logic of social responsibility,
conveyed here by the comprehensive approach, attends to, instead of
deflects attention away from, social factors that lead to the inclusion of
categories of information and people. It redistributes moral responsibility
more equally between men and women and expands the range of
choices in the negotiation process. This approach advances a greater
degree of equality, freedom, and inclusion for women and men, which
aligns it more closely than personal responsibility with feminist and
democratic goals. Nevertheless, it fails to account fully for the political
importance of the individual and authority, carries a heavy gendered
weight, and overlooks certain gendered dynamics of sexual politics. The
external framework around social and personal responsibility, most
importantly, marginalizes politics, which becomes a default category
containing the standing assumptions of deflection, assignment, and
negotiation that perpetuate exclusion, inequality, and constraint.
Collective responsibility, I argue, provides an alternative moral
groundwork. It overcomes dualisms to establish an inclusive
understanding of community in which politics represents a central
responsibility of all democratic citizens and equalizes the distribution of
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moral responsibility between categories of people and across personal,
social, and political boundaries.
Hannah Arendt’s framing of collective responsibility as explicitly
political informs this feminist revisioning. In the essay “Collective
Responsibility,” Arendt analyzes the Germans who avoided direct
participation in Hitler’s regime and claimed that as nonparticipants they
remained free from guilt or blame for their government’s actions.
Nonparticipants, she argues, assume responsibility for their government’s
deeds and misdeeds as members of the political community.
Citizenship, then, entails collective responsibility, which Arendt defines
as “always political, whether it appears in the older form, when a whole
community takes it upon itself to be responsible for whatever one of its
members has done, or whether a community is being held responsible
for what has been done in its name” (1968, 149). The fact that people
live in community with others determines the inherently political nature
of collective responsibility. Arendt, while blurring the line between a
community and its members in this context, ultimately draws a thick
boundary between the self and politics. She states, for instance, that “in
the center of moral considerations of human conduct stands the self; in
the center of political considerations of conduct stands the world” (1968,
153). Clearly separating the moral from the political, she further
underscores this boundary by contrasting personal with what she calls
political or collective responsibility to emphasize that individuals cannot
shift blame for their actions to the system under which they live
(1968, 149).
This revisioning of collective responsibility, while building on Arendt’s
attention to the way that politics relates to moral judgment, recasts the
relationship between the self and politics from an inclusive perspective.
This move prevents the dualistic operation of deflection, which transfers
responsibility for a government’s actions to the politicians and officials
and away from the people. The boundary between morality and politics
becomes more permeable. Responsibility for politics, as such, then
extends to all the people, even nonparticipants, denying them the
privileged irresponsibility of deciding whether or not to assume
responsibility for the government and its actions.
Collective responsibility facilitates this inclusion of the individual,
the social, and the political by moving from a dualistic framework to an
inclusive groundwork that conveys a different epistemological perspective
reflecting the dynamic and shifting web of relationships actually shaping
our lives and communities. Joan Tronto captures the weblike character
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of this moral geography when she defines care as “a species activity that
includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our
‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes
our bodies, our selves, and our environment, all of which we seek to
interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web” (1993, 103). The moral
terrain of collective responsibility similarly encompasses these arenas of
life and alters in response to changing needs and contexts and the
shifting boundaries among people, society, and politics that shape the
relationships extending from the individual to the local, national, and
global levels. The collective’s moral groundwork then recasts the
relational approach in terms of this weblike geography. Doing so escapes
limits placed on this approach by the dualistic framework that channels
movement in a unidirectional flow from one oppositional category to the
other by allowing for dynamic movement within and across categories
and spheres in many directions simultaneously.
The separate threads that make up a web represent the collective’s
tangible aspect in terms of the relationships and material practices
involved in the daily lives of people living in a community. This aspect
of the moral groundwork facilitates tracking the distribution of
responsibility within the collective in order to ensure relative equality.
The equalization of responsibility among all categories of citizens creates
the possibility of a collective action problem: If everyone is held
responsible for everything, then no one is responsible for anything
(Olson 1971). The cyclical approach adopted by care theorists such as
Tronto (1996) allows for greater equality while preventing this free rider
problem. Responsibilities shift and change depending on the different
capabilities, needs, and resources of the community’s members
throughout the course of their lives, which, by eliminating men’s
privileged irresponsibility, relieves women of the double burden of moral
responsibility. Negotiating the assignment of responsibilities then
becomes a site of collective engagement, since standing moral
assumptions behind who assumes responsibility when, how, for what,
why, to what degree, and for how long move from a marginal set of
inquiries to the center of public deliberation.
Collective responsibility, finally, draws out a utopic dimension deeply
embedded in this concept. The ethical moment of decision making,
when we determine the way in which we will assume responsibility for
ourselves, others, and even our communities, entails an imaginative
dimension. Many people, as Tronto illustrates in the second phase of
“taking care of,” often reach beyond their perceived capacities and
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assume responsibility for strangers, family members, and political issues in
ways that they never imagined possible. Moral imagination here entails
thinking, based on the immediate contextual reality, what could be
possible and how to achieve it, an exercise of power that we engage in
on a personal level, which can be harnessed for large-scale political
change. Revisioning collective responsibility involves the political
imagination to consider the possibility of how we all, as democratic
citizens, assume responsibility for our politics and the promise of its
ongoing transformation toward greater freedom, equality, and inclusion.
Sex education policy in the United States looks quite different from the
perspective of collective responsibility, given its inclusion of the political.
Legislation such as the Responsible Education for Life Act would locate
sexual education within a web of governmental programs designed to
provide the structural supports necessary for young people to make the
best decisions about their sexual lives. Comprehensive curricula would
expand to address explicitly and fully the sexual politics of male and
female desire, and teach young people to identify how moral
assumptions operate behind gender, sex, and sexuality in society to
convey the beliefs, attitudes, and norms that maintain heterosexism and
male privilege. Collective responsibility would recast sex and sexuality as
integral to the relationships that form a political community, where the
people all assume responsibility for distributing the resources necessary
for young people to learn and make decisions about an arena of their
lives critical to their development and that of the community. The
answer to the “whose responsibility” question, then, is that, as individuals
who live collectively in a political community, we all are responsible.
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